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INTRODUCTION
It is rush hour in Boston and a young girl boards a busy commuter
train.1 Shortly after, a strange man boards the same train and stands
uncomfortably close to the girl.2 As the train rolls on, the man begins
inappropriately touching the girl, eventually moving his hand to her
thigh.3 The girl pushes the man away, gets off the train at the next stop
and reports the incident to a nearby police officer.4 Police officers
shortly thereafter find and arrest the man responsible.5
Assume that this man had a few beers past his limit at happy hour
and could not recall the incident due to his intoxication. In most states,
there would be no legal difficulty finding this man guilty of a crime
despite his inebriated condition.6
Now assume that instead of being drunk, the perpetrator had
schizophrenia.7 While normally able to suppress his symptoms by using
antipsychotic medication,8 he recently chose to stop taking this
medication.9 When he touched his victim, he suffered delusions causing
him to believe that she welcomed his advances.10 At trial, he raises the
insanity defense.11 Should this man still be convicted? This Note will
argue that, in federal court, this man’s insanity defense should not be
rejected simply because he stopped taking his medication.
It is axiomatic in criminal law that a defendant cannot create the
circumstances of his own defense.12 Application of this truism has
precluded defendants from raising a variety of legal defenses in criminal

1 This scenario is based on the facts of Commonwealth v. Shin, 16 N.E.3d 1122, 1123
(Mass. App. Ct. 2014).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 1123–24.
6 In general, most jurisdictions do not allow intoxication caused by voluntarily drinking
alcoholic beverages to serve as a defense for a “general intent” crime. See Paul H. Robinson,
Causing the Conditions of One’s Own Defense: A Study in the Limits of Theory in Criminal Law
Doctrine, 71 VA. L. REV. 1 (1985).
7 J. STANLEY MCQUADE, MEDICAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS FOR LAWYERS § 5:64 (2d ed.
1993) (A person suffering from schizophrenia may experience delusions, illusions and
hallucinations, and dissociation from his social environment.).
8 Shin, 16 N.E.3d at 1125.
9 Id. at 1125–26.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 1124.
12 Robinson, supra note 6.
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cases,13 with some commentators going so far as to argue that this
principle should apply equally to all such defenses.14 However, courts
have been hesitant to extend its application to the insanity defense, with
some courts implying that the philosophical basis of the insanity
defense precludes any inquiry into how insanity came about.15 As a
result, no court has yet rejected a defendant’s insanity defense based
solely on his medication noncompliance.
This may soon change. Psychiatrists argue that pharmacological
developments over the past three decades give psychiatric patients
unprecedented control over their symptoms.16 Nevertheless, treatment
compliance among those suffering from schizophrenia has not improved
proportionately.17 Recent studies also find that psychiatric patients who
use antipsychotic and mood stabilizing medication commit violent
crimes less frequently than those who do not take such medication.18
Moreover, several recent high-profile tragedies—such as the school
shooting at Sandy Hook—have involved mentally ill perpetrators, thus
reinforcing the widely held belief that the mentally ill can be
dangerous.19 Calls for mental health reform are widespread and have
been answered in the political sphere.20 Against this backdrop, some
have argued that a mentally ill criminal defendant’s decision to not take
medication is a moral choice that should preclude that defendant from
raising the insanity defense.21
This was exactly the issue in Commonwealth v. Shin,22 in which a
schizophrenic man failed to take his medication and subsequently
groped a girl on the subway.23 The prosecution argued that the
13
14

See id. at 2–3.
See id. at 24 (noting that every jurisdiction considers whether a defendant caused the
conditions of his own defense to be relevant to at least certain defenses, and questioning why it
should not be equally relevant in those jurisdictions to all defenses).
15 State v. Maik, 287 A.2d 715, 722 (N.J. 1972) (“We think it compatible with the
philosophical basis of M’Naghten to accept the fact of a schizophrenic episode without inquiry
into its etiology.”).
16 Zachary D. Torry & Kenneth J. Weiss, Medication Noncompliance and Criminal
Responsibility: Is the Insanity Defense Legitimate?, 40 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 219, 221–22 (2012).
17 Id. at 222.
18 See, e.g., Seena Fazel et al., Antipsychotics, Mood Stabilisers, and Risk of Violent Crime,
384 LANCET 1206, 1211 (2014) (finding a reduction in the rate of violent crime among mentally
ill individuals who were taking antipsychotic and mood stabilizing medications as compared with
those who were not).
19 See, e.g., Jonathan M. Metzl & Kenneth T. MacLeish, Mental Illness, Mass Shootings, and
the Politics of American Firearms, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 240, 240 (2015).
20 Id. (noting that in the aftermath of the Sandy Hook shooting, several states passed laws
requiring mental health professionals to report those who they believed to be dangerous).
21 See, e.g., Torry & Weiss, supra note 16, at 221 (stating that the insanity defense is
designed to prevent the criminal punishment of those who are not blameworthy for their mental
state).
22 16 N.E.3d 1122 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014).
23 See supra notes 1–10.
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defendant’s medication noncompliance should be evaluated using a
framework designed to determine whether a defendant’s drug or alcohol
use that exacerbated a preexisting mental illness should preclude his
insanity defense.24 The trial court agreed that this framework should
apply to medication noncompliance cases, and correspondingly found
the defendant guilty.25 While the appeals court ultimately reversed,26 its
reasoning left open the possibility for future attacks on the insanity
defense.27 More importantly, the appeals court implied that it may have
been the first court to ever confront this issue.28 As such, Shin may
impact courts outside of Massachusetts, as other courts will lack binding
precedent on this novel issue.
In particular, federal courts may look to Shin when attempting to
resolve the effect of medication noncompliance on a defendant’s
insanity defense.29 Federal doctrine precludes a defendant from
successfully proving his insanity when voluntary intoxication has
played any role in causing his mental condition.30 However, federal
circuit courts have not yet determined whether this doctrine should
apply to strictly medically noncompliant offenders.31 Given the
inevitability of such a challenge,32 courts will examine non-binding
precedent in order to determine how to address this issue. When they
do, Shin will not serve as a satisfactory model to resolve this issue. 33
Thus, this Note will focus on the federal system.
This Note will argue that the federal judiciary should not consider
a defendant’s failure to take prescription medication when evaluating
that defendant’s insanity defense unless the legislature specifically
amends the statute governing the insanity defense. 34 Section I.A will
demonstrate that Shin failed to fully justify, as a matter of law, that the
medically noncompliant offender should always have the ability to raise

24
25
26
27
28

Shin, 16 N.E.3d at 1126–27.
Id. at 1126.
Id. at 1129.
See infra Part II.
Shin, 16 N.E.3d at 1128 (“Whether the Berry-DiPadova analysis is proper in a case such as
this is a difficult question and one for which our cases—and those of other jurisdictions—provide
little guidance.”).
29 See infra Sections I.A–B.
30 See infra Section I.B.
31 The Tenth Circuit briefly considered the issue of whether the insanity defense should be
available to a defendant who is insane only because he was suffering from withdrawal because he
failed to take his prescription Klonopin—a benzodiazepine drug. United States v. Fisher, 278 F.
App’x 810, 811, 813 (10th Cir. 2008). However, the court ultimately ruled on other grounds, and
thus did not decide this issue. Id. at 813.
32 See supra text accompanying notes 16–21.
33 See infra Part II.
34 See infra Part V.
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the insanity defense.35 Section I.B will discuss the analogous federal
doctrine.36 Section I.C will describe how proposed scholarly solutions
would have courts evaluate the medically noncompliant defendant’s
insanity defense.37 Part II will show that Shin’s reasoning failed to
preclude the application of these proposed scholarly solutions in a way
that is contrary to Shin’s holding, and may be used in federal courts to
preclude a medically non-compliant defendant’s insanity defense.38 Part
III will demonstrate how that result would be contrary to a doctrinally
sound understanding of the federal insanity defense.39 Part IV will argue
that judicially altering the insanity defense so that the medically
noncompliant offender cannot raise it would be an inappropriate use of
federal judicial power because federal courts cannot engage this issue
without exceeding their institutional competency and violating the
principle of separation of powers.40 Part V will propose that federal
courts should not consider a defendant’s failure to take prescription
medication when evaluating his insanity defense unless Congress
addresses this issue.41
I. THE DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND
A.

The Berry-DiPadova Analysis as Applied in Commonwealth v.
Shin

As one of the first cases in the country to address this issue,
Commonwealth v. Shin will serve as this Note’s starting point to
evaluate how federal courts should analyze the medically noncompliant
defendant’s insanity defense.42
At the core of Shin was the Berry-DiPadova framework.43 BerryDiPadova is a doctrine designed to adjudicate the guilt of offenders who
were mentally ill but were considered legally insane only because their
illness was exacerbated by their voluntary consumption of drugs or
alcohol.44 As its name implies, this analysis was developed in
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

See infra Section I.A.
See infra Section I.B.
See infra Section I.C.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
Commonwealth v. Shin, 16 N.E.3d 1122, 1129 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014) (noting that there
was “no guiding case law” upon which the trial judge could rely when deciding this issue).
43 Id. at 1127–28 (discussing the relevance of the Berry-DiPadova analysis to the medically
noncompliant defendant).
44 Id. at 1127.
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Commonwealth v. Berry45 and Commonwealth v. DiPadova,46 both of
which involved defendants who were mentally ill, had ingested
intoxicants, killed people shortly thereafter,47 and raised insanity
defenses at their trials.48
The issue in Berry was whether the trial court properly instructed
the jury on how to consider the defendant’s intoxication in evaluating
his insanity defense.49 In Massachusetts, a defendant who raises the
insanity defense must be found not guilty by reason of insanity unless
the Commonwealth proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant did not suffer from a mental disease or defect that caused him
to lack substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
conduct or conform his actions to the requirements of law. 50 While the
jury was properly instructed on this standard, the appeals court noted
that the jury instructions failed to address the defendant who was
rendered insane only due to the interaction of drugs or alcohol with his
mental illness.51 The court thus sought to create a jury instruction to
clarify when a defendant could raise the insanity defense after having
voluntarily consumed drugs or alcohol.52
45
46
47

931 N.E.2d 972 (Mass. 2010).
951 N.E.2d 891 (Mass. 2011).
In Berry, the defendant was diagnosed with bipolar and schizoaffective disorders, and had
consumed alcohol prior to repeatedly striking the victim in the head with a cinder block until he
died. Berry, 931 N.E.2d at 974–77. In DiPadova, the defendant was diagnosed with bipolar
disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and had
consumed cocaine on the night that he killed his former landlord. DiPadova, 951 N.E.2d at 893–
94.
48 Berry, 931 N.E.2d at 976; DiPadova, 951 N.E.2d at 895.
49 Berry, 931 N.E.2d at 980. The court also noted that for the conviction to be reversed, an
improper jury instruction would have had to have caused a “substantial likelihood of a
miscarriage of justice” because the defendant did not object to the jury instruction at the trial
level. Id.
50 Id. This standard was established in 1967 in Commonwealth v. McHoul, 226 N.E.2d 556,
557–58 (Mass. 1967).
51 Berry, 931 N.E.2d at 982–83.
52 The jury instruction proposed by the appeals court was as follows:
A defendant’s lack of criminal responsibility cannot be solely the product of
intoxication caused by her voluntary consumption of alcohol or another
drug. . . . However, a defendant is not criminally responsible if you have a reasonable
doubt as to whether, when the crime was committed, the defendant had a latent mental
disease or defect that became activated by the voluntary consumption of drugs or
alcohol, or an active mental disease or defect that became intensified by the voluntary
consumption of drugs or alcohol, which activated or intensified mental disease or
defect then caused her to lose the substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of
her conduct or the substantial capacity to conform her conduct to the requirements of
the law. If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant was criminally
responsible, you shall find the defendant not guilty by reason of lack of criminal
responsibility. . . . Where a defendant has an active mental disease or defect that caused
her to lose the substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct or the
substantial capacity to conform her conduct to the requirements of the law, the
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In response, the court crafted the following framework: if a
defendant was legally insane solely because of his voluntary
consumption of drugs or alcohol, then the jury should reject his insanity
defense.53 By contrast, if the defendant was legally insane before
consuming alcohol or drugs, then the jury should find him not guilty by
reason of insanity even if his illness was exacerbated by drugs or
alcohol.54 The court held that this would also be the outcome if the
defendant had an active or latent mental disease that did not cause
insanity on its own, but due to the voluntary consumption of drugs or
alcohol, was activated or intensified to the extent that it caused such
lack of capacity.55 However, the court added a caveat to this last
category; if the defendant knew or had reason to know that consuming
drugs or alcohol would render him legally insane through the activation
of a latent mental disease or intensification of an active one, then the
jury should reject his insanity defense. 56
The following year, the DiPadova court emphasized the
importance of the defendant’s knowledge of the effects that drugs or
alcohol would have on his mental illness when applying the Berry
instruction.57 The court noted that this issue was unclear after Berry
because the evidence in that case did not address the defendant’s
knowledge about the effect that drugs or alcohol would have on his
mental illness.58 Thus, the court clarified this aspect by stating that an
otherwise insane defendant who voluntarily consumed drugs or alcohol
prior to his criminal conduct could be found guilty only if (1) prior to
consuming drugs or alcohol, the defendant had capacity to appreciate
the wrongfulness of his conduct; (2) the drugs or alcohol intensified an
active disease or activated a latent disease, in turn causing a lack of
capacity; and (3) the defendant knew or should have known that drugs
or alcohol would have that effect on his illness.59
Less than five years after DiPadova, prosecutors sought to extend
this doctrine to the medically noncompliant offender in Shin.60 There,
the defendant was accused of assault and battery for groping a girl of
fourteen years of age or older while riding the subway on January 20,

defendant's consumption of alcohol or another drug cannot preclude the defense of lack
of criminal responsibility.
Id. at 984 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
53 See id. at 983–84.
54 See id. at 984.
55 See id.
56 See id. at 984, n.9.
57 Commonwealth v. DiPadova, 951 N.E.2d 891, 901 (Mass. 2011).
58 See id. at 900–01.
59 See id. at 900.
60 See Commonwealth v. Shin, 16 N.E.3d 1122 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014).
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2011.61 The defendant was diagnosed with schizophrenia in 2005 and
had been hospitalized six times between 2005 and 2009 as a result.62
While the defendant had been prescribed antipsychotic medication, an
expert at trial testified that the defendant was not taking his medication
for some time before the incident, and was consequently experiencing
symptoms of schizophrenia.63 These symptoms included an impaired
ability to perceive reality, which may have caused the defendant to
believe that his victim was welcoming his advances.64 The expert
concluded that as a result of these symptoms, the defendant could not
appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions or conform his conduct to the
requirements of law at the time of his offense.65
The prosecution urged the court to extend the Berry-DiPadova
analysis to this case—and reject the defendant’s insanity defense—
because the defendant’s insanity resulted from his failure to take
prescription antipsychotic medication.66 While the trial court agreed
with the prosecution, the appeals court refused this argument, and stated
that a defendant’s failure to take antipsychotic medication should not
alter the availability or outcome of his insanity defense.67
While the appeals court sought to preclude Berry-DiPadova’s
application to medication noncompliance cases as a matter of law,68 the
discussion that followed in fact weakened this holding. 69 In that
discussion, the court listed several reasons to distinguish medication
noncompliance from the interaction of intoxication with mental
illness.70 First, the court noted that psychiatric patients fail to take
medication for a variety of reasons, and that unlike the ingestion of
drugs or alcohol, such reasons are frequently not blameworthy. 71
61
62
63
64
65
66

Id. at 1123.
Id. at 1124.
Id. at 1126.
Id. at 1125–1126.
Id. at 1126.
Id. at 1127–1128.
[H]ere, the question is not whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily consumed
alcohol or drugs that exacerbated his inability to understand the wrongfulness of his
behavior or undermined his capacity to conform his behavior to the requirements of the
law, but whether his failure to take prescribed medication had those
effects. . . . Whether the Berry-DiPadova analysis is proper in a case such as this is a
difficult question[.]

Id. (emphasis retained).
67 Id. at 1128.
68 See id. (“Berry and DiPadova have no applicability in a circumstance where the allegation
is that the defendant’s lack of criminal responsibility arises only from a failure to take prescribed
medication.”).
69 See id. at 1127–29.
70 See id. at 1127–28.
71 See id.
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Additionally, the court noted that different medications require different
amounts of time to take effect, and determining when a defendant
stopped taking his medication and what his mental state was at that time
would thus be difficult.72 The court additionally asserted that the BerryDiPadova analysis is inappropriate for medication noncompliance cases
because, unlike alcohol and substance abuse, failure to take medication
does not cause mental illness, but rather leads to the manifestation of
symptoms arising from a preexisting mental illness. 73 Finally, the court
argued that using the Berry-DiPadova framework in the case of a
medically noncompliant defendant cannot be confined to a logical
stopping point, and thus could be used to justify finding any defendant
guilty if that defendant previously took medication and later stopped.74
As will be discussed, this reasoning fails to fully justify the holding. 75
After arguing that the Berry-DiPadova analysis should not apply,
the court nevertheless cursorily applied the analysis to show that the
defendant was not at fault for his own noncompliance, and thus could be
acquitted due to his insanity even if the doctrine applied.76 The court
justified this by opining that the defendant may not have been sane even
when he was compliant with his medication.77 Additionally, no
evidence had established that the defendant was ever compliant with his
medication between his most recent hospital release in 2009 and his
arrest in 2011.78 Finally, the court noted that Mr. Shin may have been
unable to obtain his medication due to insurance problems.79 Thus, the
court concluded that the defendant would not have been precluded from
a successful insanity defense even if Berry-DiPadova applied because
his failure to take medication either did not result in his insanity or was
not voluntary.80
[M]entally ill people fail to take prescribed medication for a myriad of reasons,
including, for example, side effects that may be otherwise dangerous to their
health. . . . In addition, some people are unable to obtain the appropriate medication
because of lack of money or access to medical care, or problems with necessary
paperwork such as may have occurred in this case.
Id. (citations omitted).
72 Id. at 1128.
73 Id. As will be discussed, this distinction is blatantly erroneous, because Berry-DiPadova
already distinguishes between situations in which drugs and alcohol cause insanity from
situations in which symptoms of a mental illness are exacerbated—though not directly caused
by—drugs or alcohol. See infra Part II. Here, medication noncompliance is analogous to the latter
situation because both scenarios involve a preexisting mental illness.
74 Shin, 16 N.E.3d at 1129.
75 See infra Part II.
76 Shin, 16 N.E.3d at 1128–29.
77 Id. at 1129.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 See id. at 1128–29.
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While not binding on federal courts, the analysis discussed above
is relevant to federal doctrine due to a lack of federal precedent, as well
as similarities between the federal and Massachusetts insanity defenses.
B.

The Federal Insanity Defense

In comparison to the Berry-DiPadova analysis, the federal system
is even stricter in precluding voluntarily intoxicated, mentally ill
defendants from being found not guilty by reason of insanity. To justify
an insanity verdict in a federal case, a defendant must prove by clear
and convincing evidence that at the time of the offense, he was unable
to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts due
to a severe mental disease or defect.81 Federal courts have long held that
voluntary intoxication cannot be the cause of the mental disease or
defect required for a successful insanity defense, nor can the defense be
successful if the defendant is insane due, in any part, to the interaction
of such intoxication with a preexisting mental illness.82
These stringent requirements are based on the “rule,” as stated in
prior cases, that a mental disease or defect for the purposes of the
insanity defense must be brought about by circumstances outside of the
actor’s control.83 Though the federal insanity defense has changed in
formulation over the years,84 this “rule” is applicable to the present
81
82

See 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2012).
See Kane v. United States, 399 F.2d 730, 736 (9th Cir. 1968) (“[D]isability which [the
defendant] does acquire from drinking liquor was within his own control and cannot be classified
as a mental illness excusing criminal responsibility.”); see also United States v. Burnim, 576 F.2d
236, 237 (9th Cir. 1978) (“In evaluating Burnim’s mental state, the court was obliged to disregard
whatever incapacitating effects were attributable to the voluntary ingestion of alcohol.”).
83 Kane, 399 F.2d at 735 (“[T]he mental condition which produced such disability must have
been brought about by circumstances beyond the control of the actor.”); Burnim, 576 F.2d at 238
(“[M]ental disability, however defined, must have been brought about by circumstances beyond
the control of the actor.”).
84 When Kane was decided in 1968, the Ninth Circuit applied the M’Naghten test for
insanity. See Kane, 399 F.2d at 735. The key inquiry under the M’Naghten standard is whether
“at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of
reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing,
or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.” Charles Fischette,
Note, Psychopathy and Responsibility, 90 VA. L. REV. 1423, 1442 (2004) (citation omitted). Ten
years later, Burnim applied a modified version of the American Law Institute’s proposed standard
for insanity. Burnim, 576 F.2d at 238. The current federal insanity defense, enacted as the
Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 17, and provides that: “It is an
affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute that, at the time of the commission
of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect,
was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or
defect does not otherwise constitute a defense.” 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (2012). Additionally, “[t]he
defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence.”
Id. § 17(b).

Andreu.2017 (Do Not Delete)

6/11/2017 12:01 PM

2017] M E DI C A L LY N ON C OM P LI A N T OF F E N DE R S

43

insanity defense in many circuits, including the Second,85 Third,86 and
Ninth.87
Insofar as the federal insanity defense is currently governed by
statute, federal courts have also deferred to legislative intent to prohibit
the insanity defense when voluntary intoxication partially causes the
defendant’s mental state. In United States v. Garcia, the Second Circuit
noted that Congress enacted the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 88
(IDRA) to narrow the definition of insanity in response to “public
concern” arising from the acquittal of John W. Hinckley, Jr.—the man
who attempted to assassinate President Ronald Reagan. 89 Additionally,
the Second and Ninth Circuits noted that in enacting the IDRA, the
Senate Judiciary Committee expressly noted its intention to preserve the
doctrine that excluded mental states arising from voluntary intoxication
from constituting legal insanity. 90 Because Congress meant to narrow
the definition and scope of the insanity defense and also exclude

85 See United States v. Garcia, 94 F.3d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that allowing a jury to
consider the effect of voluntary drug or alcohol use on mental illness for an insanity defense
would violate congressional intent to preclude availability of the insanity defense to defendants
who lack capacity due to voluntary consumption of drugs or alcohol).
86 See United States v. Cuebas, 415 F. App’x 390, 396 (3d Cir. 2011) (rejecting the
defendant’s argument that he should be granted an insanity instruction when voluntary
intoxication exacerbated an underlying mental illness).
87 United States. v. Knott, 894 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1990).

We hold that under the Insanity Defense Reform Act, the defendant’s voluntary drug
use or intoxication at the time of the crime may not be considered in combination with
his mental disease or defect in determining whether the defendant was unable to
appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his acts.
Id.
88
89

Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2057 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2012)).
Garcia, 94 F.3d at 61. A defense expert at trial stated that John W. Hinckley Jr. suffered
from “process schizophrenia” at the time that he shot the President. Stuart Taylor Jr., Shootings
by Hinckley Laid to Schizophrenia, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 1982), http://www.nytimes.com/1982/
05/15/us/shootings-by-hinckley-laid-to-schizophrenia.html. Hinckley was acquitted because he
did not “appreciate” the “wrongfulness” of his conduct, as required for a criminal conviction in
federal court at the time. Vincent J. Fuller, Symposium, United States v. John W. Hinckley Jr.
(1982), 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 699, 699–700 (2000). Hinckley’s counsel stated it was “quite
apparent . . . that [Hinckley] was mentally disturbed at the time of the 1981 shooting.” Id. at 699.
As evidence of Hinckley’s detachment from reality, Hinckley’s counsel referred to a letter that
Hinckley wrote to actress Jodie Foster on the morning of the shooting. Id. at 700.
90 Garcia, 94 F.3d at 61–62 (“Of significance to this case, Congress, speaking through the
Senate Judiciary Committee, stated: ‘The committee also intends that, as has been held under
present case law interpretation, the voluntary use of alcohol or drugs, even if they render the
defendant unable to appreciate the nature and quality of his acts, does not constitute insanity or
any other species of legally valid affirmative defense.’”) (citation omitted); Knott, 894 F.33d at
1121–22 (“Although the issue we address here is not the validity of an insanity defense based on
voluntary intoxication alone, we are instructed by Congress’s statements about voluntary
intoxication. Prior to the Act, a majority of courts followed the rule that the mental effects of
voluntary intoxication did not excuse responsibility for a criminal act. The legislative history
demonstrates Congress’s intent to carry this rule forward.”) (citation omitted).

Andreu.2017 (Do Not Delete)

44

C A R D OZ O LA W R E V I E W D E • N OV O

6/11/2017 12:01 PM

[2017

voluntary intoxication from giving rise to a successful insanity defense,
courts have held that Congress must also have intended to prohibit an
insanity acquittal when the defendant’s mental state was caused by the
interaction of voluntary intoxication with a preexisting mental disease
or defect.91 Thus, unless the defendant was insane prior to taking drugs
or alcohol, federal courts refuse to allow an insanity acquittal when the
defendant’s mental state was caused in any part by voluntary
intoxication.92
Federal circuits have yet to address whether this rule is applicable
to a medically noncompliant defendant. However, the Tenth Circuit had
the opportunity to consider a closely related issue: whether a defendant
should be entitled to an insanity verdict when the defendant was
experiencing withdrawal symptoms after failing to take prescription
medication.93 In United States v. Fisher, the defendant was an exconvict who was prescribed Klonopin94 to treat his anxiety disorder.95
However, the defendant had not been taking this medication for some
time before he illegally possessed a shotgun. 96 At trial, the defendant
presented evidence that he was insane at the time of his conduct due to
Klonopin withdrawal.97 The trial court instructed the jury that if the jury
found the defendant insane due to his voluntary failure to take
prescription medication, and that he knew that such failure would bring
about his condition, then they should reject his insanity defense. 98
On appeal, the government sought to have the jury instruction
affirmed based on the principle that the defendant may not raise the
91

See Garcia, 94 F.3d at 62.
The government responds that ‘combining a mental disease or defect that is itself
insufficient under the IDRA, with the impermissible consideration of voluntary
substance abuse, to result in a valid defense of insanity under the IDRA, is wholly
illogical. This would constitute nothing short of rewarding the voluntary abuse of drugs
and alcohol in direct contradiction of the intent of Congress in passing the IDRA.’ The
caselaw on this issue, although limited, recognizes as much, and we agree.

Id.; Knott, 894 F.2d at 1122 (“When we combine Congress’s statements about voluntary
intoxication with its clear intent to narrow the common law definition of insanity . . . we are
persuaded that voluntary intoxication combined with a mental disease will not support an insanity
defense under the Act.”) (citation omitted).
92 See supra note 91.
93 See United States v. Fisher, 278 F. App’x 810, 813 (10th Cir. 2008).
94 Klonopin is a benzodiazepine which is used to treat panic disorders and seizures. Lauren
Connell Pavelka, Klonopin (Clonazepam), in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHILD BEHAV. AND DEV. 855
(Sam Goldstein & Jack A. Naglieri eds., 2011).
95 Fisher, 278 F. App’x at 811.
96 Id. at 811–12.
97 See id. at 812.
98 Id. (“Over the defense’s objection . . . the district court also instructed the jury that Fisher
could not claim insanity if his ‘condition was produced by [his] voluntary failure to take a
prescription drug or [his] voluntary failure to obtain a prescription renewal and . . . that [he] knew
that that failure would produce [his] condition.’”).
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insanity defense when insanity is caused in any part by drugs. 99 The
defendant-appellant warned that because this case dealt with a failure to
take drugs, such a ruling would be relevant to future defendants with
schizophrenia who failed to take prescription medication.100 However,
the Tenth Circuit dodged this issue, and instead affirmed based on the
“overwhelming evidence” that the defendant’s withdrawal was not
severe enough to constitute insanity. 101 Thus, there is no federal
precedent instructing courts how to evaluate the medically
noncompliant defendant’s insanity defense.
While there is a dearth of case law indicating how federal courts
should handle this issue, scholars have proposed a number of solutions
for courts to consider.
C.

Proposed Scholarly Solutions

Some argue that failure to inquire into the source of the medically
noncompliant offender’s symptoms102 does not accord with “moral
intuition”103—or a person’s intuitive feelings based on internalized
99
100

Id. at 813.
See Brief for Appellant at 17–18, United States v. Fisher, 278 F. App’x 810 (10th Cir.
2008) (No. 07-6161).
101 Fisher, 278 F. App’x at 813.
We need not decide whether or when such a withdrawal will support an insanity
defense, because even assuming that insanity can be raised on the basis of withdrawal
and that the district court erred in giving its limiting instruction, there is overwhelming
evidence that Fisher was not suffering from withdrawal so severe as to render him
insane at the times he possessed Knight’s shotgun.
Id. (citations omitted).
102 See, e.g., State v. Maik, 287 A.2d 715, 722 (N.J. 1972) (“We think it compatible with the
philosophical basis of M’Naghten to accept the fact of a schizophrenic episode without inquiry
into its etiology.”).
103 “Moral intuitions” here refers to the argument made by many scholars that acquitting a
medically noncompliant defendant seems intuitively unfair when the defendant knew or should
have known the consequences of failing to take his medication. See Edward W. Mitchell,
Culpability for Inducing Mental States: The Insanity Defense of Dr. Jekyll, 32 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 63, 63 (2004) (“That Dr. Jekyll should be found not guilty of criminal acts
committed while in his altered persona seems to be intuitively unjust. Is he not culpable, at least,
for inducing a state in which he might commit such terrible acts?”); see also Richard Sherlock,
Compliance and Responsibility: New Issues for the Insanity Defense, 12 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 483,
486 (1984).
[I]f the patient had knowingly and willfully stopped taking his medication and had then
relapsed into a manic state, would we not want to hold him responsible for being in a
manic state for the harms he commits while in that state? Is he not at least partially to
blame for those harms?
Id. at 488 (“Surely [holding the defendant responsible] seems more in keeping with our common
moral intuitions than does the result achieved by a strict application of the standards found in the
ALI version of the insanity defense or in any of the recent proposals for revision.”). One author
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social norms of what acts should be deemed criminal. While scholars
have proposed several solutions to align the law with these moral
intuitions,104 courts are most likely to adopt the proposal that medication
noncompliance should be analyzed similarly to how courts analyze
voluntary intoxication.105 The following discussion outlines the
doctrinal underpinnings of this approach.
A voluntarily intoxicated defendant may be found guilty through
the imputation of mens rea.106 Mens rea is generally defined as the state
of mind that must accompany a criminal act for the defendant to be
convicted of a crime.107 When mens rea is imputed, it is transferred
from an earlier time, at which a defendant possessed a culpable state of
mind, to the time of the criminal conduct, when the defendant lacked
such a mental state. For example, due to his intoxication, a person who
is “black-out” drunk may not be able to form an intention to commit a
crime at the time of his criminal conduct, and thus may lack the mens
rea necessary to convict him of a crime.108 However, courts and
legislatures view the very act of voluntarily becoming intoxicated as a
reckless one.109 As such, the recklessness associated with becoming
intoxicated is imputed to the later time at which the defendant cannot
form any culpable mental state.110 In so doing, the prosecution is
provided with the mens rea that is necessary to convict the defendant.111
Likewise, the insanity defense also concerns the culpability of the
has defined “ethical intuition” as “the unconscious recognition of the moral qualities of an action
without a resort to reason.” Eric C. Chaffee, An Interdisciplinary Analysis of the Use of Ethical
Intuition in Legal Compliance Decisionmaking for Business Entities, 74 MD. L. REV. 497, 498
(2015); see also Mitchell, supra note 103, at 66.
104 See Mitchell, supra note 103, at 66 (arguing that a criminal proceeding should be separated
into three stages: “(1) determining guilt or innocence to the charge; (2) determining whether the
defendant was suffering from a [defect of mind] (e.g., mental disorder, intoxication, substance
abuse); and (3) determining the defendant’s level of culpability for that [defect of mind].”); see
also Torry & Weiss, supra note 16, at 236–38 (arguing that medically noncompliant offenders
should be prosecuted under reckless endangerment statutes for the purposes of using the criminal
justice system therapeutically).
105 See supra Section I.B–C. This proposal is particularly strong because it is based on existing
legal doctrine.
106 See Michael D. Slodov, Criminal Responsibility and the Noncompliant Psychiatric
Offender: Risking Madness, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 271, 288–89 (1989).
107 Id.
108 See, e.g., United States v. Kenyon, 481 F.3d 1054, 1070 (8th Cir. 2007) (“A defendant
charged with a specific intent crime is entitled to an intoxication instruction when ‘the evidence
would support a finding that [the defendant] was in fact intoxicated and that as a result there was
a reasonable doubt that he lacked specific intent.’”) (citation omitted).
109 See Robinson, supra note 6, at 15.
110 See id.
111 See id. Robinson notes, however, that only recklessness may be imputed to the defendant in
this situation. Id. Thus, a defendant may only be convicted of an offense which requires that the
defendant acted recklessly—such as manslaughter—but may not be convicted of an offense in
which the defendant must act with purpose or knowledge—such as murder. Id. at 14–15.
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defendant’s mental state at the time of his conduct. 112 Proponents of the
imputation of mens rea for the medically noncompliant offender equate
the insane defendant’s lack of responsible agency at the time of a crime
with the voluntarily intoxicated defendant’s lack of consciousness with
respect to a mental state that must accompany a material element of a
crime. This facilitates the conclusion that, just as with voluntary
intoxication, the prosecution should be able to impute a culpable mental
state from an earlier point at which the defendant made an immoral
choice—here, the decision not to take his medication.113
Under the imputation described above, a defendant could still be
acquitted on insanity grounds if he did not have a culpable mental state
regarding his noncompliance. For example, if a defendant truly did not
realize that he would become insane when he stopped taking his
medication, then he would not be acting recklessly when he failed to
take his medication, and his insanity defense could still prove
successful.114 By contrast, a defendant’s insanity defense would fail if
he understood that not taking his medication could lead to insanity, and
nevertheless disregarded this risk.115 By allowing the defendant in the
former example to go free while enabling the defendant’s conviction in
the latter example, this approach appears to comport with “moral
intuitions”116 in a way that prohibiting inquiry into the source of
insanity does not.
Shin did not adopt this approach, and instead sought to prohibit the
factfinder from considering the defendant’s medical noncompliance
when evaluating his insanity defense.117 However, the court’s reasoning
in fact only justifies prohibiting the imputation of mens rea with a
defendant who would have been acquitted under the Berry-DiPadova
analysis anyway.
II. SHIN’S INADEQUATE REASONING
Chief among the court’s reasons for not applying Berry-DiPadova
in Shin was that, unlike drug or alcohol consumption, the mentally ill
112 See Slodov, supra note 106, at 315 (“An examination of [the insane defendant’s] mens rea
at the time of the offense will most likely lead to an unsatisfying result. His delusional belief that
he was making lemonade at the time he was killing the people would negate mens rea.”).
113 See id. at 311–12. (“If, as in the epilepsy and intoxication contexts, we were to expand the
time frame to include in our examination the events that led to [a noncompliant offender’s] lack
of capacity, we could choose to impose liability for his precedent conduct and focus on the risk
taken, or subsequent conduct and focus on the harm done.”).
114 See id. at 322–23.
115 See id. at 312–15.
116 See Mitchell, supra note 103, at 66.
117 See supra text accompanying notes 68–74.
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fail to take medication for a variety of reasons, many of which are not
culpable.118 The court made a point of noting that this was likely the
case with Mr. Shin himself, who may have had difficulty obtaining his
medication due to insurance complications.119 However, this issue can
be remedied by allowing for an insanity acquittal when the
noncompliance is involuntary or otherwise performed without a
sufficiently culpable state of mind. Berry-DiPadova in fact already
provides for this by allowing for an insanity acquittal in cases when the
intoxication is involuntary, or when the defendant did not know or have
reason to know of the effect that the drugs or alcohol would have on his
mental illness.120 Even the stricter rule applied by federal courts
distinguishes based upon voluntary and involuntary intoxication, and
thus could potentially exclude those like Mr. Shin, whose reason for
noncompliance may have been beyond his control.121 Stated otherwise,
if a defendant was not responsible for his treatment relapse, then even
under Berry-DiPadova or the scholarly approach discussed above, he
could be entitled to an insanity acquittal.122
The court also contended that Berry-DiPadova should not apply to
Mr. Shin because it would be difficult to determine when a defendant
stopped taking his medication and what his mental state was at that
time.123 However, it is unlikely that a fact-finder would have more
difficulty determining the prior mental state of a medically
noncompliant offender than that of a voluntarily intoxicated defendant.
Even assuming there is a difference, the prior mental state and efficacy
of a defendant’s treatment may be able to be proven through expert
testimony. The efficacy of psychiatric medications, 124 their side
118 Commonwealth v. Shin, 16 N.E.3d 1122, 1127–28 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014) (noting that
mentally ill people sometimes fail to take medication for health reasons, financial reasons, or
administrative reasons, and that these reasons make the choice to become noncompliant with
medication categorically different from than choice to consume drugs or alcohol).
119 Id. at 390.
120 See supra text accompanying note 59.
121 See United States v. Garcia, 94 F.3d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1996) (discussing only voluntary
substance abuse and voluntary intoxication); see also United States v. Knott, 894 F.2d 1119, 1123
(9th Cir. 1990) (“We hold that under the Insanity Defense Reform Act, the defendant’s voluntary
drug use or intoxication at the time of the crime may not be considered in combination with his
mental disease or defect in determining whether the defendant was unable to appreciate the nature
and quality or wrongfulness of his acts.”) (emphasis added). When intoxication is involuntary,
courts typically find the Burnim exception to the insanity defense inapplicable. United States v.
Henderson, 680 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Because the Government failed to introduce any
evidence to rebut the evidence that Henderson’s drinking was involuntary, the Burnim exception
to the insanity defense is inapplicable.”).
122 See supra text accompanying notes 112–118.
123 Shin, 16 N.E.3d at 1128 (“[S]ome medications work better than others, or take time to
become effective, and the difficulty of discerning when, exactly, someone stopped taking
medication and what his mental state was at that time would be challenging at best.”).
124 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Lieberman et al., Effectiveness of Antipsychotic Drugs in Patients with
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effects,125 and common reasons for medication noncompliance among
the mentally ill126 are issues that have generated a great deal of
research.127 Additionally, when a defendant takes antipsychotic
medication, that patient often undergoes additional diagnostic tests and
procedures after his initial treatment is prescribed.128 This will create a
“paper trail” which could allow a defendant to introduce evidence
regarding the effectiveness of his treatment.129 Thus, just as a forensic
psychiatrist might use prior treatment evaluations and specialized
knowledge to evaluate the effects of alcohol on a defendant’s mental
illness, that psychiatrist could use similar methods to determine whether
an antipsychotic medication was effectively treating a patient’s
symptoms and why that patient might have stopped taking the
medication.
Additionally, the court attempted to distinguish between
medication noncompliance and voluntary intoxication by arguing that
medication noncompliance, unlike voluntary intoxication, does not
cause mental disease or defect.130 However, this misstates the role of
intoxication in Berry-DiPadova. That doctrine is aimed at determining
whether a defendant should be found legally insane when an active
Chronic Schizophrenia, 353 THE NEW ENGLAND J. OF MED. 1209 (2005) (analyzing the relative
effectiveness and rates of discontinuation of second-generation antipsychotic drugs as compared
to older agents in patients with chronic schizophrenia).
125 See, e.g., B.A. Ellenbroek, Treatment of Schizophrenia: A Clinical and Preclinical
Evaluation of Neuroleptic Drugs, 57 PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 1, 18–31 (1993)
(discussing the various adverse side effects of drugs which are widely used to treat
schizophrenia).
126 See, e.g., John L. Young et al., Medication Adherence in Schizophrenia: A Forensic
Review of Rates, Reasons, Treatments, and Prospects, 27 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 426,
430–31 (1999) (describing risk factors which may lead to noncompliance, as well as methods for
evaluating effectiveness of treatment in promoting compliance).
127 See infra notes 124-26.
128 The American Psychiatric Association’s Practice Guidelines for the Treatment of
Schizophrenia recommend ongoing monitoring and assessment even after a patient “has achieved
an adequate therapeutic response with minimal side effects or toxicity with a particular
medication regimen.” AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, PRACTICE GUIDELINES FOR THE
TREATMENT OF PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS, 595–96 (2006). Such a patient “should be monitored
while taking the same medication and dose for the next 6 months.” Id. at 595. This monitoring
can result in useful insight into how the medication affected the patient.
129 Under Massachusetts law, a patient has the privilege to refuse to disclose any
communication between him and his psychiatrist in any Court proceeding, and may also prevent
others from disclosing such information. MASS.GEN.LAWS. 233 § 20B (2001). However, a
patient may waive this privilege, and would thus be able to produce assessments indicating that
his medication was not effective. Id.
130 Commonwealth v. Shin, 16 N.E.3d 1122, 1128 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014) (“‘The source of the
lack of substantial capacity [was] the critical factor in determining whether the defendant [was]
criminally responsible’ in those cases. . . . It strains that analysis considerably to apply it to a
defendant such as this, because his mental illness is not caused by his failure to take medication,
even though the medication might alleviate it somewhat or even entirely.”) (citation omitted)
(emphasis retained).
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mental illness is intensified or exacerbated by drugs or alcohol. 131 By
contrast, the analysis prohibits a defendant’s successful insanity defense
whenever the illness is caused solely by alcohol.132 Thus, BerryDiPadova already distinguished instances in which a defendant’s
insanity was caused by alcohol from instances in which alcohol instead
intensified or exacerbated that illness. By distinguishing medication
noncompliance on this ground, the court inaccurately described the
issue addressed by Berry-DiPadova.
Finally, the court noted that the Commonwealth’s argument, when
taken to its extreme, has no logical stopping point.133 In other words, the
court believed that it had no principled way to distinguish the defendant
who brought on a schizophrenic episode by failing to take his
medication last week from one who stopped taking his medication
twenty years ago. While it may in fact be difficult to decide how far
back the court should look before it no longer considers noncompliance
relevant to an offense, this time-framing issue is not unique to
medication noncompliance. For example, this issue frequently arises
regarding the requirement that the defendant’s conduct be voluntary. 134
This issue can be philosophically daunting to resolve, such that it may
be impossible to determine beforehand when courts will apply a broad
time frame and when they will apply a narrow time frame.135 However,
in practice, courts rarely have difficulty selecting a time frame which
they believe is not too remote as to no longer have a just bearing on the

131 See id. at 1127 (noting that the Berry-DiPadova framework applies when a preexisting
mental illness is exacerbated or intensified by voluntary intoxication.). Where insanity is
produced solely by the voluntary consumption of drugs or alcohol and without any preexisting
mental illness, then the defendant is precluded from raising the insanity defense.
132 See Commonwealth v. Berry, 931 N.E.2d 973, 984 (Mass. 2010) (“‘A defendant’s lack of
criminal responsibility cannot be solely the product of intoxication caused by her voluntary
consumption of alcohol or another drug.’”) (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v.
Sheehan, 383 N.E.2d 1115, 1119 (Mass. 1978) (“If the defendant’s lack of substantial capacity to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law
is solely the product of his voluntary consumption of drugs, he does not meet the McHoul test,
even if he has a mental disease or defect.”) (citation omitted).
133 Shin, 16 N.E.3d at 1129 (stating that when taken to its logical extreme, the argument
advanced by Massachusetts in favor of finding a medically noncompliant defendant guilty “could
be used to argue that every mentally ill defendant who had ever taken helpful medication in the
past, but discontinued it, was criminally responsible. . . .”).
134 See Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 591, 593–94 (1981) (“Often, conduct is deemed involuntary (or determined) rather than
freely willed (or intentional) because we do not consider the defendant’s earlier decisions that
may have put him in the position of apparent choicelessness. Conversely, conduct that could be
viewed as freely willed or voluntary if we looked only at the precise moment of the criminal
incident is sometimes deemed involuntary because we open up the time frame to look at prior
events that seem to compel or determine the defendant’s conduct at the time of the incident.”).
135 For a discussion which illustrates the difficulty in reconciling cases in which a narrow time
frame was used with cases in which a broad time frame was used, see id. at 604–05.
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defendant’s culpability.136 Thus, despite conceptual difficulties, courts
and juries are well-equipped to handle this time-framing issue.
Shin’s reasoning thus leaves a lot to be desired in setting out the
categorical rule that the court sought to adopt. This might require future
Massachusetts courts to consider whether Shin’s reasoning was limited
to its facts or if it should indeed be read as implementing a distinction as
a matter of law between medication noncompliance and mental illness
that is exacerbated by the voluntary use of drugs or alcohol. However,
as one of the first courts to squarely address137 this issue, Shin may have
broader implications than its immediate impact in binding
Massachusetts courts. This issue has rarely been addressed, and is thus
likely to be an issue of first impression wherever it next arises. Just as
the Massachusetts appeals court sought guidance in other state and
federal decisions,138 other courts may look to Shin as they encounter this
issue.
Instead of relying on Shin and other proposed scholarly solutions,
future courts should first clarify the role that mens rea doctrine plays in
evaluating the medically noncompliant offender’s insanity defense.
III. DOCTRINAL CONFUSION
As stated, precluding the medically noncompliant offender from
successfully raising the insanity defense relies on the transference of
mens rea from the time of noncompliance to the time of the criminal
conduct.139 Proponents of this view argue that this imputation is
consistent with the law’s treatment of the epileptic or voluntarily
intoxicated driver who passes out at the wheel of his car, driving it into
a victim and killing him.140 However, any analogy between those
scenarios and the medically noncompliant defendant relies on doctrinal
confusion between the distinction of mens rea in the sense of a mental
state that must accompany a material element of a crime, and mens rea
136 Kelman suggests that discussions of these philosophical time-framing issues do not
frequently appear in legal opinions because time-framing is an “arational” and “unconscious
interpretive construct.” See id. at 593–94.
137 See supra note 47.
138 The court determined that there were little to no cases from outside of Massachusetts’
jurisdiction that would help resolve these issues. See Shin, 16 N.E.3d at 1128 (“Whether the
Berry-DiPadova analysis is proper in a case such as this is a difficult question and one for which
our cases—and those of other jurisdictions—provide little guidance.”) (emphasis added).
139 See Part I.C.; see also Slodov, supra note 106, at 283 (“Responsibility may be
imposed . . . by imputing the mental state behind the precedent conduct to the subsequent
offense.”).
140 See Slodov, supra note 106, at 273 (“Ignoring factors that contribute to the existence of the
mental illness, specifically noncompliance with treatment, is contrary . . . to the judicial
disposition of other self-induced incapacities like voluntary intoxication and epilepsy . . . .”).
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in the sense of the general moral agency that a defendant is required to
possess in order to be held responsible for his actions. For the sake of
brevity, the former will be referred to as special mens rea,141 whereas
the latter will be referred to as general mens rea.142 While the
imputation of the former—as in the cases of epileptic and voluntarily
intoxicated drivers—is founded in settled doctrine,143 imputation of the
latter—which would be necessary to preclude a medically noncompliant
offender from a successful insanity defense—is unprecedented.144 Thus,
such an approach should be rejected by courts as a departure from
settled doctrine.
Both the epileptic and voluntarily intoxicated driver scenarios
represent the imputation of special mens rea. For example, if either an
epileptic or intoxicated driver passed out at the wheel of his car and ran
down and killed a pedestrian, then the driver would probably be charged
with manslaughter.145 A conviction under the federal manslaughter
statute requires a showing that the defendant recklessly caused the death
of a human being.146 In that case, the special mens rea required by a
charge of manslaughter would be recklessness, because in order to
convict the defendant, the prosecution would have to prove that the
defendant was reckless in relation to the material element of causing
death.
Now assume that the driver of the vehicle passed out at the wheel
because he was an epileptic who failed to take his medication and chose
to drive.147 Such epileptic person likely knew that if he failed to take his
medication, he would be at a greater risk of suffering an epileptic
seizure, and that if he drove a car and subsequently suffered a seizure,
141 See Stephen J. Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 8 (1984) (“‘[S]pecial’ mens rea [is] the specific mental state element that is part
of the definition of the crime and thus part of the prosecution’s prima facie case . . . .”).
142 Id. at 8 (“‘[G]eneral’ mens rea . . . [is the] lack of responsibility that might be produced in
whole or in part by factors such as legal insanity, duress, or partial responsibility.”).
143 See infra text accompanying notes 151–155.
144 See infra text accompanying notes 156–160.
145 See, e.g., United States v. Semsak, 336 F.3d 1123, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that a
drunk driver that killed his victim after colliding with the victim’s vehicle was charged with
involuntary manslaughter).
146 The federal charge of involuntary manslaughter involves the unlawful killing of a human
being, without malice, in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death “without due
caution and circumspection.” 18 U.S.C. § 1112 (2012). While not explicitly stated in the statute,
federal courts generally require a showing of recklessness to convict a defendant of involuntary
manslaughter. See, e.g., United States. v. Garcia, 729 F.3d 1171, 1177 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding
that involuntary manslaughter conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1112 required showing of gross
negligence, which court defined as “wanton or reckless disregard for human life.”) (quotations
omitted) (emphasis added).
147 This situation is factually similar to People v. Decina, 138 N.E.2d 799 (N.Y. 1956). There,
the defendant had a history of epileptic seizures and blacked out while driving, after which his car
hit and killed four schoolchildren. Id. at 800–03.
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he would place other motorists and pedestrians at a greater risk of injury
or death.148 Nevertheless, he chose to drive his car while off of his
medication, suffered a seizure, and ran down a pedestrian. The problem
with proving recklessness at the time of this offense is that the driver
was unconscious, and therefore incapable of forming any mental state.
However, the defendant was nevertheless reckless when he decided to
drive his car after failing to take his medication because at that time, he
consciously disregarded the risk of causing injury. Thus, by transferring
this recklessness from an earlier point, the government can still prove a
prima facie case.149 Similarly, when a defendant disregards a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that he might drive after becoming intoxicated,
then his recklessness can be imputed from that earlier time point even if
he blacked out and thus could not in fact form a reckless mental state
while driving.150
By contrast, the defendant who raises the insanity defense does not
claim that he could not or did not form mens rea with regard to a
specific element, but instead argues that he lacked general mens rea.151
This is a logically distinct concept from special mens rea, and presents
different doctrinal issues.152 For example, if instead of being epileptic or
intoxicated, the driver from earlier were in the midst of a schizophrenic
episode and intentionally drove his car into his victim because he
believed that doing so would impress a young Jodie Foster, 153 there
would be no doubt that he was not only reckless as to causing death, but

148 These, of course, could be a factual issue at trial, because the government would still have
to prove that the defendant knew of and consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable
risk. See id. at 803–04.
149 See Slodov, supra note 106, at 292 (“The difficulty associated with finding mens rea
associated with the subsequent conduct without looking back in time to the freely-chosen caused
conduct is that at some levels of incapacity, no mens rea will be found with respect to the
subsequent act.”).
150 See id. at 293–94 (“If [the defendant] had been aware that a substantial and unjustifiable
risk of harm existed and he chose to disregard those risks and become intoxicated, he would be
appropriately held responsible for manslaughter.”). Note that this imputation falsely equates a
general recklessness with recklessness as to a particular material element. Nevertheless, the
impropriety of this false equivalency is outside of the scope of this note.
151 See Morse, supra note 141, at 8 (“Courts and commentators consistently fall prey to
confusing ‘special’ mens rea, the specific mental state element that is part of the definition of the
crime and thus part of the prosecution’s prima facie case, and ‘general’ mens rea, a generic term
for lack of responsibility that might be produced in whole or in part by factors such as legal
insanity, duress, or partial responsibility.”).
152 See id. (“A defendant who lacks special mens rea is acquitted because his conduct fails to
satisfy the state’s definition of the offense, not because he lacks responsibility. The conduct of a
defendant who lacks general mens rea almost always satisfies the elements of the prima facie case
including special mens rea, but he is acquitted because he is not considered responsible for his
conduct.”).
153 John W. Hinckley Jr. may have attempted to assassinate President Reagan because he
believed that it would impress actress Jodie Foster. See Taylor, supra note 89.
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in fact intended to cause death at the time of the offense. 154 Despite the
special mens rea requirement being satisfied, this defendant would still
be able to raise the insanity defense on the grounds that he lacked
general mens rea.155
There may still be compelling policy justifications to preclude the
medically noncompliant offender’s insanity defense. For example,
developments in antipsychotic medication over the past few decades
have given patients effective treatment and unprecedented control over
their symptoms, making the choice to exhibit symptoms a moral one.156
Nevertheless, any such legal development cannot be disguised as a
simple application of settled doctrine. Instead, this shift should be
recognized as a departure from existing doctrine. Insofar as this new
rule would be motivated by policy concerns, the judiciary is not the
appropriate body to adopt such a rule. Instead, the legislature is the
more appropriate political branch to promulgate this doctrinal shift.
IV. FEDERAL JUDICIAL POWER AND THE INSANITY DEFENSE
As stated, altering the federal insanity with respect to the medically
noncompliant offender represents a policy decision and not an
application of settled law.157 The federal legislature—and not the
judiciary—is the more appropriate branch to enact this change.158 This
is due to the constitutional doctrine of “separation of powers,”
previously expressed legislative intent regarding the insanity defense,
and the legislature’s comparative competency to fashion a rule
154 Such a defendant would be acting purposely insofar as it was his conscious objective to kill
his victim, and he was aware that he was killing a human being. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02.
When a defendant’s mental disease or defect negates special mens rea, the defendant is actually
raising what is generally termed a diminished capacity defense. See Morse, supra note 141, at 5–
7. That defense is surrounded by a host of controversy, with many commentators arguing that it is
simply a failure of proof defense that should not be distinguished or treated differently from any
other such defense. See id. Nevertheless, the effect that medication noncompliance would have on
the diminished capacity defense is beyond of the scope of this Note.
155 This argument is actually diminished capacity, not insanity. See Henry F. Fradella, From
Insanity to Beyond Diminished Capacity: Mental Illness and Criminal Excuse in the Post-Clark
Era, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 7, 47–48 (2007).
156 See Sherlock, supra note 103, at 485 (“Both in legal punishment and moral blame we have
a deep-seated sense that it is wrong to punish people for either acts they did not know were wrong
or that they could not prevent themselves from doing. In the last decade, however, developments
in psychiatric medicine have rendered this seemingly uneventful conclusion increasingly
questionable. The most significant of these developments is our increasing capacity to control the
most severe forms of mental illness with appropriate pharmacological management.”).
157 See supra Part III.
158 The features that a congressionally enacted law limiting the insanity defense should have is
outside of this note. Moreover, such a law may be susceptible to constitutional challenge. See
infra notes 186–187 and accompanying text. However, the hypothetical constitutionality of such a
law is outside of the scope of this note as well.
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reflecting “moral intuitions.”
A.

Separation of Powers and Clear Legislative Intent

Prior to the IDRA’s enactment, the federal insanity defense was
governed by case law.159 Before Hinckley was found not guilty by
reason of insanity for attempting to assassinate President Reagan,160
most federal circuits applied the American Legal Institute’s standard of
insanity.161 However, Congress responded to Hinckley’s acquittal by
enacting the IDRA,162 which restricted the insanity defense’s
availability by removing the volitional prong of the insanity defense, 163
requiring the mental disease or defect to be severe, 164 and shifting the
burden to the defendant to demonstrate his insanity by clear and
convincing evidence.165 In essence, the legislature responded to public
159 Joseph P. Liu, Note, Federal Jury Instructions and the Consequences of a Successful
Insanity Defense, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1223, 1231 (1993) (“Prior to 1984, there existed no
uniform federal definition of criminal insanity. In the absence of a definitive declaration from
either Congress or the Supreme Court, federal circuits enjoyed wide discretion in defining what
constituted criminal insanity.”).
160 Stuart Taylor Jr., Hinkley [sic] Is Cleared but Is Held Insane in Reagan Attack, N.Y. TIMES
(June 22, 1982), http://www.nytimes.com/1982/06/22/us/hinkley-is-cleared-but-is-held-insane-inreagan-attack.html?pagewanted=all.
161 See Liu, supra note 159, at 1231.

In the absence of a definitive declaration from either Congress or the Supreme Court,
federal circuits enjoyed wide discretion in defining what constituted criminal insanity.
Many circuits eventually adopted the definition set forth in the ALI Model Penal Code,
under which a defendant was not held criminally responsible if he lacked ‘substantial
capacity’ either (1) to appreciate the criminality of his conduct (the ‘cognitive’ test) or
(2) to conform his conduct to the requirement of law (the ‘volitional’ test).
Id.
162 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2012); see also United States v. Garcia, 94 F.3d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1996)
(“Congress enacted the IDRA, the first federal legislation on the insanity defense, largely in
response to public concern over the acquittal of John W. Hinkley [sic], Jr. for the attempted
assassination of President Reagan.”).
163 S. REP. NO. 98–225, at 225 (1984) (“The principal difference between the statement of the
defense in S. 1762 and that presently employed in the federal courts is that the volitional portion
of the cognitive-volitional test of the ALI Model Penal Code is eliminated.”).
164 Id. at 229.

The provision that the mental disease or defect must be ‘sever’ [sic] was added to
Section 20 as a committee amendment. As introduced in S. 829, the provision referred
only to a ‘mental disease or defect.’ The concept of severity was added to emphasize
that non-psychotic behavior disorders or neuroses such as an ‘inadequate personality,’
‘immature personality,’ or a pattern of ‘antisocial tendencies’ do not constitute the
defense.
Id.
165 Id. at 229 (“Significantly, the bill as reported shifts the burden of proof of the insanity
defense to the defendant, who must demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that his
severe mental disease or defect caused him not to appreciate the nature and quality or
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dissatisfaction with the judicially established insanity test by statutorily
abrogating it.166
However, in a report, the Senate Judiciary Committee noted its
intention to maintain the doctrine prohibiting insanity from being a
defense when the mental disease or defect is brought about by voluntary
intoxication.167 The Second Circuit interpreted this statement as
unambiguous approval168 of the doctrine precluding the insanity defense
when the defendant is voluntarily intoxicated, even when a mental
disease or defect is partly to blame for the resulting insanity. 169
However, unlike the broad formulations of this doctrine found in earlier
cases,170 the Senate Judiciary Committee discussed this doctrine only as
it related to the voluntary consumption of drugs or alcohol.171 Thus,
while it was previously plausible to read broad statements of this
doctrine as relevant to the medically noncompliant offender, 172 the
Senate Judiciary Committee’s precise language reveals the narrow
scope of this exception. Courts have since relied on these statements in
interpreting the IDRA, thereby incorporating them into federal
doctrine.173
By contrast, nothing in either the statute or the Senate Judiciary
Report indicates that Congress meant to prohibit the defense for the

wrongfulness of his acts.”).
166 See, e.g., Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Construction and Application of 18 U.S.C.A. § 17,
Providing for Insanity Defense in Federal Criminal Prosecutions, 118 A.L.R. FED. 265 (1994)
(stating that Congress enacted the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, which made the federal
insanity defense more difficult to satisfy, as a response to the “public outcry and pressure
surrounding the use of the insanity defense in the prosecution of John Hinckley for the attempted
assassination of President Reagan.”).
167 S. REP. NO. 98–225, at 229 (1984).
168 See United States v. Garcia, 94 F.3d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Statements of congressional
intent are rarely so clear.”).
169 See id. at 61–62.
170 See Kane v. United States, 399 F.2d 730, 735–36 (9th Cir. 1968) (“[T]he mental condition
which produced such disability must have been brought about by circumstances beyond the
control of the actor.”); see also United States v. Burnim, 576 F.2d 236, 238 (9th Cir. 1978)
(“[M]ental disability, however defined, must have been brought about by circumstances beyond
the control of the actor.”).
171 See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 229 (1984).
The committee also intends that, as has been held under present case law interpretation,
the voluntary use of alcohol or drugs, even if they render the defendant unable to
appreciate the nature and quality of his acts, does not constitute insanity or any other
species of legally valid affirmative defense.
Id. (emphasis added).
172 This is because early statements of the rule used broad phrasing that could be applicable to
any situation in which the defendant’s action or inaction somehow induced his insanity. See, e.g.,
Kane, 399 F.2d at 735–36.
173 See Garcia, 94 F.3d at 61–62 (relying on the statement in the Senate Judiciary Report to
determine how to apply the IDRA standard).

Andreu.2017 (Do Not Delete)

6/11/2017 12:01 PM

2017] M E DI C A L LY N ON C OM P LI A N T OF F E N DE R S

57

medically noncompliant offender.174 While congressional silence
regarding medication noncompliance leaves courts to fill in the gap,
courts would be unreasonable to interpret this silence to mean that
Congress would have intended to treat medication noncompliance and
voluntary intoxication similarly when applying the IDRA. Congress
frequently responds to drug and alcohol issues with criminal
proscriptions, but does not typically do so for mental health issues. For
example, Congress has made it a crime to manufacture, distribute, or
possess various controlled substances175 with the ultimate intention of
curbing the use of such intoxicating substances.176 By contrast,
Congress has enacted mental hygiene legislation to combat medication
noncompliance177 but has not criminalized the refusal to take psychiatric
medication.
There are several possible explanations as to why Congress
addresses these issues differently. One explanation is simply that moral
intuitions indicate that drug and alcohol consumption is more morally
blameworthy than a failure to take prescription medicine.178 This
difference may also be explained by the Supreme Court’s recognition
that the Due Process Clause protects a liberty interest in refusing the
forced administration of antipsychotic medication in various contexts.179
Thus, a law attaching criminal penalties to the refusal to take
medication could potentially raise substantive due process issues insofar
as it criminalizes a defendant’s exercise of his constitutionally protected
liberty.180 Whatever the reason, Congress has clearly addressed these
issues differently in federal legislation.181 Thus, treating the two issues
174
175

See S. REP. NO. 98-225.
See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012). Controlled substances under the act include, inter alia,
heroin, cocaine, marijuana, and phenylcyclidine (PCP). See § 841(b)(1)(B). A defendant
convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841 may be sentenced to life in prison. See § 841(b).
176 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 801(2) (2012) (stating in the congressional findings supporting the
Controlled Substances Act that the “improper use of controlled substances have a substantial and
detrimental effect on the health and general welfare of the American people.”) (emphasis added).
177 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4243(g) (2012) (allowing the Attorney General to revoke an insanity
acquitee’s conditional discharge from a medical facility, and reinstate that noncompliant patient
to a medical facility, for failure to adhere to a prescribed medication regimen).
178 But see Mitchell, supra note 103, at 64–65 (noting the similarity between a defendant who
induces insanity by consuming an intoxicant and a defendant who induces insanity by failing to
consume medication).
179 See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990) (recognizing that respondent
had “a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
180 Whether such a law would actually be unconstitutional is outside of the scope of this Note.
However, the appellants in United States v. Fisher argued that such a law imposes an affirmative
duty on defendants to take medication and thus violates a recognized liberty interest under the
Due Process Clause. See Brief for Appellant (with attachments in scanned PDF form) at 17,
United States v. Fisher, 278 F. App’x 810 (10th Cir. 2008) (No. 07-6161).
181 See supra notes 175–177 and accompanying text.
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identically when applying the IDRA would not only be outside of
Congress’s stated intent, but likely contradicts what Congress would
have done had it expressly considered this issue.
In sum, the federal insanity defense is currently governed by
statute.182 This indicates that Congress intended to control the federal
insanity defense.183 Courts have acknowledge this by stating that the
IDRA must be applied according to its plain language and the
underlying congressional intent.184 The Senate Judiciary Committee
asserted its intention to preserve the doctrine prohibiting an insanity
defense when the mental disease or defect is brought about in any part
by voluntary intoxication,185 but was silent on the issue of medication
noncompliance.186 It is also unreasonable to argue that Congress would
have precluded the insanity defense in such a scenario if it had
expressly considered the issue.187 Thus, a judicial expansion of this
exception would contradict congressional intent and would depart from
182
183

See 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2012).
See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 222 (1984).
Title IV of the bill amends various provisions of Title 18, U.S.C. and the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure relating to the insanity defense and the procedures to be
followed in federal courts with respect to offenders who are or have been suffering
from a mental disease or defect. The legislation includes a definition of the insanity
defense that will substantially narrow the definition, which has evolved from case law,
presently applied in the federal system. Title IV also provides that the defendant shall
have the burden of proving the insanity defense by clear and convincing evidence and
prohibits expert opinion testimony on the ultimate legal issue of whether the defendant
was insane.

Id.; see also United States v. Garcia, 94 F.3d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1996).
Congress enacted the IDRA, the first federal legislation on the insanity defense, largely
in response to public concern over the acquittal of John W. Hinkley [sic], Jr. for the
attempted assassination of President Reagan. In enacting the IDRA, Congress made
two substantial changes to the federal insanity defense. First, it narrowed the definition
of insanity that had evolved from the caselaw. Second, it shifted to the defendant the
burden of proving the insanity defense by clear and convincing evidence.
Id. (citation omitted).
184 See Garcia, 94 F.3d at 61 (“Because the charge is not covered expressly by the text of the
Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 (‘IDRA’), 18 U.S.C. § 17, in examining the charge for
error, we are required to look to the congressional intent behind the IDRA and to existing
caselaw.”).
185 See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 229 (1984)
The committee also intends that, as has been held under present case law interpretation,
the voluntary use of alcohol or drugs, even if they render the defendant unable to
appreciate the nature and quality of his acts, does not constitute insanity or any other
species of legally valid affirmative defense.
Id.
186 Neither the statute nor the Senate report mention what effect, if any, a defendant’s failure
to adhere to a treatment regime should have on the defense. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2012);
S. REP. NO. 98-225.
187 See supra text accompanying notes 175–181.
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the deference that the judiciary owes the legislature in a government of
separated powers.188
In addition to constitutional concerns, prudence also dictates that
Congress is more well-adapted than the courts to craft a rule addressing
the effect of a defendant’s medication noncompliance on his insanity
defense.
B.

Practical Consequences and Institutional Competencies

Judicial deference to Congress on this issue is justified by
institutional competencies—namely, the legislature’s comparative
competency to account for empirical considerations and exercise greater
flexibility when crafting rules.189 One empirical factor that would be
outside of the court’s concern when drafting a new rule is the amount of
potential cases that could be affected by such a rule. A defendant’s prior
use of antipsychotic medication is highly correlated with a finding of
not guilty by reason of insanity190—in fact, nearly half of all successful
insanity defenses involve defendants who previously used antipsychotic
medication.191 Given that these offenders were insane at the time of
their conduct, many of these individuals likely stopped taking their
medication before committing their crimes.192 A rule precluding a
defendant from successfully raising the insanity defense if he fails to
188 See Craig W. Dallon, Note, Interpreting Statutes Faithfully—Not Dynamically, 1991
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1353, 1353 (1991) (“Our system of government anticipates that courts will
construe and interpret statutes that legislative bodies enact.”).
189 See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative Fact-Finding, 84
IND. L.J. 1, 8 (2009) (“In enacting a piece of legislation, a legislative body, generally through a
committee, collects factual evidence relevant to the proposal. It then makes a policy judgment as
to whether action is warranted in light of the facts.”).
190 Richard Rogers et al., A Study of Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Individuals
Evaluated for Insanity, 28 INT. J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 3, 7–8 (1984)
(“Four socio-demographic variables were found to be significantly associated with both clinical
and subsequent legal decision. Of these, prior histories of schizophrenia and psychoactive
medication were highly correlated (phi = .68) and were, as expected, associated with a finding of
not guilty by reason of insanity.”).
191 See id. at 6. Of all factors that the study found relevant in predicting whether a not guilty
by reason of insanity verdict would be reached, prior use of psychoactive medication was found
to be tied with schizophrenia for the second highest correlation among defendants who
successfully raised the defense. See id. at 8.
192 In addition to the intuitive conclusion that those who continued their treatment are less
likely to exhibit psychotic symptoms, this is also probable given the high percentage of
medication noncompliance among the entire population of patients prescribed antipsychotic
medication. See Torry & Weiss, supra note 16, at 230–31 (“Over 50% of patients on
antipsychotic medications exhibit full or partial nonadherence. Within 7 to 10 days of medication
initiation, 25% stop taking the medication; 50% stop after 1 year; and 75% stop after 2 years.
Only 33% of patients with mental illness reliably take medications as prescribed.”) (citations
omitted).
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take his medication thus has the potential to preclude the insanity
defense for as many as half of those who would otherwise be able to
successfully raise the defense.193 The insanity defense is rarely raised,
and even more rarely successful.194 Thus, a doctrinal shift that may
drastically limit the defense even further should not be made without
first considering the full empirical extent of the change and whether it is
warranted.
Additionally, courts are not adequately equipped to craft a rule
accounting for the complexity of medication noncompliance. The
judiciary often relies on traditional legal terminology when forming
legal doctrine. For example, Berry-DiPadova conditioned the
defendant’s ability to raise the insanity defense on whether he knew or
should have known of the effects of drugs or alcohol.195 Use of these
judicial heuristics may preclude the insanity defense when
noncompliance occurs for other reasons that may not be blameworthy.
For example, a schizophrenic man may stop taking his neuroleptic
medication because it makes him severely depressed,196 despite
knowing that his schizophrenia would get worse if he stopped taking
this medication. Some may consider this choice reasonable given the
side effect. However, he could nevertheless be precluded from raising
the insanity defense if the test focuses solely on whether he knew that
he would exhibit psychotic symptoms if he stopped taking his
medication.197 Thus, the judiciary may not have the flexibility necessary
to adequately address the nuanced issues inherent in medication
noncompliance.
193 While it cannot be assumed that the defendant would be found guilty every time
medication noncompliance is an issue, it could nevertheless affect the outcome of any case in
which the defendant had at one point taken medication. This is especially true if the federal
judiciary were to simply extend the doctrine expressed in Garcia, and prohibit a successful
insanity defense whenever but for the defendant’s noncompliance, he would have been sane. See
United States v. Garcia, 94 F.3d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that allowing jury to consider
effect of voluntary drug or alcohol use on mental illness for insanity defense would violate
congressional intent to preclude availability of insanity defense to defendants who lack capacity
due to voluntary consumption of drugs or alcohol).
194 See Fradella, supra note 155, at 12 (“In fact, the insanity defense is used quite rarely. It is
only raised in approximately 1% of all felony cases, and when invoked, the insanity defense is
successful less than 25% of the time.”).
195 See Commonwealth v. Shin, 16 N.E.3d 1122, 1127 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014) (noting that
pursuant to DiPadova, juries are instructed that a defendant is “criminally responsible if he knew
(or should have known) that the consumption would have the effect of intensifying or
exacerbating his mental condition . . . .”).
196 See Wayne S. Fenton et al., Determinants of Medication Compliance in Schizophrenia:
Empirical and Clinical Findings, 23 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 637, 641 (1997) (“Neuroleptic side
effects that may be particularly unpleasant include sedation, anticholinergic effects, cognitive
blunting, depression, sexual dysfunction, and extrapyramidal syndromes—dystonia, akinesia,
Parkinsonian effects, akathisia, and tardive dyskinesia.”).
197 See Shin, 16 N.E.2d at 1127.
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The rigidity of judicial law-making198 reflects the fact that the
court’s role is to interpret and apply the law to the facts before it.199 As
such, any judge-made rule is necessarily limited by the doctrine being
interpreted and the facts of the case.200 Here, judges would be limited to
interpreting whether mens rea could be imputed—as proposed by
several scholars201—and thus would focus on whether the defendant
was aware of the risks when he stopped taking his medication.202 This
would not take into account that the mentally ill fail to take their
medication for a variety of reasons, including adverse side effects, lack
of family and social support, and practical barriers such as lack of
money.203 Even if a case before the court implicated one of these
factors, all of these factors cannot be expected to be present in a single
case. Crafting a rule in response to one which adequately accounts for
the others may be difficult in the judicial setting. Conversely, Congress
has greater flexibility when crafting the law to tailor its policy to its
findings of fact.204 Thus, the latter body is better suited to deal with the
complexities surrounding this issue and navigate this landscape in a way
that reflects moral intuitions.
Finally, insofar as prohibiting the insanity defense in medication
198 See Roger J. Traynor, No Magic Words Could Do It Justice, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 615, 620
(1961).
199 See Dallon, supra note 188, at 1353–54 (“The constitutional structure of our democratic
system disapproves of any philosophy that invites calculated judicial lawmaking each time a
statute is interpreted. Rather it calls upon the judiciary to interpret and apply the law to cases
which come before it.”).
200 See Traynor, supra note 198, at 620 (“Many forces constrain review within extremely
narrow limits. The most immediate constraint is the controversy itself that calls for decision; even
the unprecedented controversy automatically precludes any ambitious excursion beyond its own
context.”).
201 See supra Part I.C.
202 See Slodov, supra note 106, at 283 (“Responsibility may be imposed . . . by imputing the
mental state behind the precedent conduct to the subsequent offense.”).
203 See Fenton, supra note 196, at 642.
204 See Borgmann, supra note 189, at 8; see also Sol Wachtler, Judicial Lawmaking, 65
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (1990).

The judicial process may only be commenced by a person intimately and currently
engaged in a dispute in which that person stands to be tangibly and personally injured
unless government intervenes. In direct contrast to the legislature, where the
lawmakers themselves have the final authority formally to commence the lawmaking
process, the judiciary is completely barred from doing so. Moreover, the mode and
extent of judicial inquiry, as compared to that of the legislature, is at once severely
constricted in latitude and exponentially more intrusive in depth. The court’s universe
is limited to one particular real-life dispute, and its world is made up only of facts
relevant to the origin, implications, and resolution of a discrete conflict. Unlike the
legislature, in a conflict of any importance the judiciary issues an opinion which, if it is
‘worth its salt,’ positions the case in the contextual, historical, and cultural dimensions
making up the legal landscape.
Id.
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noncompliance cases reflects “our moral intuitions,” the legislature—
and not the federal judiciary—is the appropriate branch to transform
these intuitions into law.
C.

“Moral Intuitions”

As previously stated, some scholars have argued that it is
intuitively unjust to acquit a defendant who is at fault for causing the
conditions of his own defense, even if he is insane at the time of his
crime.205 At the core of this argument is the notion that the criminal law
should reflect “moral intuitions” by attaching criminal penalties to
behaviors that society deems immoral.206 As proof that “moral
intuitions” support the conviction of the medically noncompliant
offender, proponents of this argument point to voluntary intoxication as
an analogous situation.207 Both situations involve a defendant
voluntarily bringing about a state of mind—through either the ingestion
of or abstinence from a mind altering substance—which would require
the defendant’s acquittal if it were not willfully induced.208 More
generally, both scenarios involve a defendant who may be culpable for
creating the circumstances of his own defense.209 Thus, if our moral
intuitions cannot distinguish between the wrongfulness of voluntary
intoxication and that of medication noncompliance, and these moral
intuitions are the driving force behind attaching criminal penalties to
conduct, then one who commits the latter should not be set free so long
as one guilty of the former is criminally penalized.
However, even assuming that moral intuitions should influence
federal criminal law,210 and that those moral intuitions demand that the
205 See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 103, at 66 (noting that “[o]ur moral intuition” favors holding
the medically noncompliant defendant “culpable for bringing about his murderous state”).
206 For example, Paul H. Robinson states that a “widely-stated goal of criminal law theory is to
create the set of rules that best implements our collective sense of justice” in discussing his
theoretical framework for addressing all situations in which a defendant creates the circumstances
of his own defense. Robinson, supra note 6, at 1.
207 See Slodov, supra note 106, at 273
208 See id. (“Ignoring factors that contribute to the existence of the mental illness, specifically
noncompliance with treatment, is contrary not only to the judicial disposition of other selfinduced incapacities like voluntary intoxication and epilepsy but also to the theories behind the
insanity defense and the goals of the criminal law.”) (citation omitted).
209 As already noted, the criminal law generally seeks to prohibit a defendant from raising a
defense when that defendant is responsible for creating the conditions of that defense. See
generally Robinson, supra note 6.
210 Whether the criminal law should embody community moral standards, or should instead
embody less strict utilitarian principles, was famously the subject of “the Hart-Devlin debate.”
See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Symposium, Legal Moralism and Liberalism, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 73, 74
(1995). Some scholars note that those who expounded the idea that the law should reflect
community morals were the clear losers in that debate. See Alice Ristroph, Symposium, Third
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insanity defense not be available to the medically noncompliant
offender,211 the federal judiciary is not the proper governing body to
mold the law to these moral intuitions. Article III of the United States
Constitution was framed with the intention to insulate federal judges
from being influenced by social pressures.212 Insofar as these moral
intuitions originate within society, 213 sensitivity to societal morality is
crucial to properly converting these moral intuitions into law. By
contrast, the institutional role of the federal judge is designed to shield
that judge from the will of the people and their moral intuitions. 214 As a
result, Article III judges are afforded numerous protections to preserve
their institutional independence, including selection to life terms
through presidential appointment instead of public election to timelimited terms.215 This protection is intended to allow a judge to be
guided by the law and render a judgment that might not accord with
popular moral intuitions.216
Conversely, a judge who makes a policy-driven decision often
faces the criticism that he is substituting his own individual preferences
for the law, instead of interpreting and applying the law pursuant to his
institutional role.217 This is especially true of criminal law, in which
Wave Legal Moralism, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1151, 1152 (2011). Nevertheless, resolving which legal
philosophy should underlie the criminal law is outside of the scope of this Note.
211 But see supra text accompanying notes 174–179 (noting that Congress has previously
treated voluntary intoxication as distinct from medication noncompliance).
212 See U.S. CONST. art. III; Vicki C. Jackson, Conference, Packages of Judicial
Independence: The Selection and Tenure of Article III Judges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965, 969 (2007)
(noting that the founders intended Article III judges, to be “independent of popular passions and
certain kinds of pressures from other branches of the government”).
213 Robinson’s reference to “our collective sense of justice” implies that the moral intuitions
with which the criminal law should be concerned are held not just by a single individual, but by a
broader social group. See Robinson, supra note 6, at 1 (emphasis added). Moreover, Murphy
notes that Devlin—the primary proponent of legal moralism in the Hart-Devlin debate—was
concerned with “violations of a society’s shared morality” when speaking of the moral intuitions
that should give rise to criminal penalties. See Murphy, supra note 210, at 76 (emphasis added).
214 See Jackson, supra note 212, at 969.
215 Id. at 967–69.
216 Id. at 969.
The harder question is what were judges to be independent to do? Some answers are:
they were to be independent to judge according to law; they were to have the
independence to interpret the law in order to render judgment; they were to protect
minorities from popular passions that would violate their legal rights; and they were to
check the other branches of government when they departed from the fundamental
commitments set forth in the Constitution.
Id.
217 For example, the Warren Court was widely criticized by members of all three branches of
the federal government—particularly regarding its judicial reformation of criminal procedure—
for engaging in “judicial activism.” See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Symposium, Judicial Activism or
Judicial Necessity: The D.C. District Court’s Criminal Justice Legacy, 90 GEO. L.J. 685, 691–94
(2002). One commentator criticized the Warren Court for being guided by a “simple moral
compass” instead of reasoned legal arguments. See id. at 694.
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offenses are statutorily defined in the federal system and all states.218
Thus, if a federal judge prohibited a medically noncompliant defendant
from raising the insanity defense based on moral intuitions, that judge
would risk overstepping his institutional bounds and writing his own
policy preferences into an area of law governed by Congress.
Instead, Congress is the proper body to enact these moral intuitions
into criminal laws. As elected officials, congressmen are more attuned
to their constituents’ moral intuitions.219 Failure to adhere to these
intuitions could lead to backlash at the polls, as members of Congress
must be elected.220 In fact, Congress has already demonstrated
sensitivity to moral judgments regarding the insanity defense when it
passed the IDRA221 amidst public dissatisfaction with John W. Hinckley
Jr.’s insanity acquittal.222 Thus, if the insanity defense is to be altered in
medication noncompliance cases because of moral intuitions, Congress
is the best suited branch to do so.
V. PROPOSAL
Federal courts should hold that a defendant’s failure to comply
with psychiatric treatment is irrelevant when evaluating that defendant’s
218 See Kevin C. McMunigal, A Statutory Approach to Criminal Law, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
1285, 1285 (2004).

The Supreme Court . . . announced almost 200 years ago that there are no federal
common law crimes. As a result of the nineteenth century codification movement,
every American state has for decades accepted the notion of legislative supremacy in
Criminal Law—the idea that legislators rather than judges should create and define
criminal offenses.
Id.
219 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 383 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“[I]n a
democratic society legislatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to the will and consequently
the moral values of the people.”).
220 Members of the House of Representatives are elected every two years. U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 2. cl. 1. Members of the Senate are elected every six years. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
221 See supra notes 159–166 and accompanying text.
222 See Jay M. Zitter, Construction and Application of 18 U.S.C.A. § 17, Providing for Insanity
Defense in Federal Criminal Prosecutions, 118 A.L.R. FED. 265 (1994).

As one of the responses to public pressure surrounding the use of the insanity defense
in the prosecution of John Hinckley for the attempted assassination of President
Reagan, Congress enacted the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 (18 U.S.C.A.
§ 17), which toughened the standard for the application of the defense in federal cases.
Id. A poll conducted by ABC shortly after John W. Hinckley Jr.’s trial in 1982 found that 76
percent of those polled believed that justice had not been done in his trial for the attempted
assassination of President Ronald Reagan, which resulted in an insanity acquittal. Associated
Press, Hinkley [sic] Acquittal Brings Moves to Change Insanity Defense, N.Y. TIMES (June 24,
1982),
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/06/24/us/hinkley-acquittal-brings-moves-to-changeinsanity-defense.html.
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insanity defense. Unlike situations in which the ingestion of drugs or
alcohol exacerbated a defendant’s mental illness, Congress did not
consider medication noncompliance at all when it passed the IDRA.223
Thus, precluding the insanity defense for the medically noncompliant
offender would not be simple statutory interpretation, but would be
judge-made law in an area that Congress governs by statute.224 This
would not only violate the separation of powers doctrine, but would also
take the judiciary outside of its institutional competency by forcing it to
craft a rule that it has neither the expertise nor flexibility to adequately
create.225 Finally, crafting such a rule would be motivated by moral
intuitions more properly considered by Congress than by federal
courts.226
In lieu of a statutory response, federal courts should simply rely on
a traditional application of the insanity defense 227 and defer to the
legislature for any future modifications of the defense. 228 When the
insanity defense’s traditional reasoning is applied to the medically
noncompliant offender, medication noncompliance is irrelevant to an
insanity defense’s analysis.229 This outcome reflects the traditional role
of the judiciary in interpreting criminal law, which is to interpret and
apply the law as it has been enacted by Congress. 230
As shown by Shin,231 it is difficult for courts to adequately
distinguish between insanity enhanced by medication noncompliance
and insanity enhanced by voluntary intoxication.232 Any judicial foray
into this issue claims a power for the judiciary which more properly
belongs to the legislature,233 even if the judiciary ultimately rejects the
argument to prohibit the medically noncompliant offender’s insanity
defense.234 Moreover, even in rejecting the argument that medication
noncompliance should preclude a defendant from obtaining a “not
guilty by reason of insanity” verdict, a court’s reasoning through this
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234

See supra Section IV.A.
See supra Section IV.A.
See supra Section IV.B.
See supra Section IV.C.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part IV.
In other words, by considering and ultimately rejecting the relevance of the defendant’s
medication noncompliance to his insanity defense on the grounds that it is factually
distinguishable from voluntary intoxication, the court implicitly grants that it could have ruled
otherwise and instead chose not to. By instead deferring to the legislature based upon separation
of powers principles, the court makes clear that only the legislature has the power to come to a
contrary ruling.
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issue is liable to create confusing statements, inconsistencies, and
contradictions to be exploited in future cases.235 In any event, the
judicial ability to formulate a rule may not be nuanced enough to create
a fair and readily applicable law to apply in all noncompliance cases.236
Thus, considering the merits of this argument—even while ultimately
denying its conclusion—may create the opportunity to undermine this
outcome in later cases.237
Congress may see fit to treat the medically noncompliant offender
differently in the future.238 When that occurs, the congresspeople who
enacted the law will be held politically responsible at the polls for
effecting such a change.239 These congresspeople would also be more
likely than the federal judiciary to have sufficient information and
flexibility to craft a nuanced response to this complicated issue. 240 Thus,
the most appropriate response in light of the complexity of medication
noncompliance and the constitutionally mandated principle of
separation of powers is for federal courts to hold that the insanity
defense applies without restriction in medication noncompliance cases
because the federal judiciary is constitutionally incapable and
pragmatically ill-equipped to create an exception to the insanity defense
when the defendant fails to take his prescribed antipsychotic
medication.
CONCLUSION
Serving as a federal judge is difficult enough without having to
keep pace with a myriad of rapidly evolving scientific fields. 241 In
particular, the treatment of psychiatric diseases has become an
increasingly complicated field as treatment methods have changed and
improved significantly over the past three decades.242 A judicial foray
into the similarities and differences between medication noncompliance
and voluntary intoxication is liable to create more headaches than it

235
236
237
238

See supra Part II and III.
See supra Section IV.B.
See supra Part II.
Congress has already changed the federal insanity defense by enacting the Insanity Defense
Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2012), and is of course free to continue to do so through
subsequent legislation. Whether Congress should enact such a rule, however, is beyond the scope
of this Note.
239 See supra Section IV.C.
240 See supra Section IV.B.
241 As noted by Judge Koszinski, judicial scrutiny of scientific methods and expert testimony
can be a “daunting” and “heady task” for federal judges. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.,
43 F.3d 1311, 1315–16 (9th Cir. 1995).
242 See Torry & Weiss, supra note 16, at 221–22.
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cures.243 Instead, federal judges should defer to Congress, which in
theory has the expertise, flexibility, and moral authority to concoct a
suitable remedy.244 Whether this treatment may be prescribed in all
states is beyond the scope of this Note—for example, this approach may
not be suitable in jurisdictions in which the insanity defense is governed
by case law instead of statute.245 Nevertheless, by deferring to the
legislature, at least federal courts will refrain from inducing a bout of
doctrinal insanity.

243
244
245

See supra Part II.
See supra Part IV.
Massachusetts—the State in which Shin was decided—notably falls into this category. See
Commonwealth v. Shin, 16 N.E.3d 1122, 1123, 1127 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014).

